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BANKRUPTCY AND CREDITORS' RIGHTS
Roger S. Cox*
I. INTRODUCTION
his Article addresses major cases of interest arising primarily in
Texas-based bankruptcy courts that deal directly with the debtor-
creditor relationship and state law issues arising under exemption
and homestead claims. Given the substantial growth in consumer bank-
ruptcy filings, this year's Survey focuses on recent developments affecting
consumer cases, especially collateral valuation, interest rates on secured
claims, and disposition of property securing consumer debts.
II. BANKRUPTCY
A. SECURED CLAIMS-CONSUMER CASES
1. Collateral Valuation
The saga of In re Rash' is over at last. The Supreme Court reversed the
Fifth Circuit's en banc decision, which was analyzed in last year's Survey. 2
In short, the Supreme Court has held that when a debtor, over a secured
creditor's objection, seeks to retain and use collateral, section 506 of the
Bankruptcy Code directs application of a replacement-value standard.3
The Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's application of a hypothetical liqui-
dation standard, and it also rejected a "midpoint between foreclosure and
replacement values."' 4 Rather, the Court found that "under § 506 (a), the
value of property retained.. .is the cost the debtor would incur to obtain a
like asset for the same 'proposed... use." 5 In what may prove to be an
important footnote, however, the Court cautions that its holding leaves to
bankruptcy courts the determination of whether replacement value is the
equivalent of retail value, wholesale value or some other value, depend-
ing upon the nature of the debtor and the proposed use of the property.6
* Shareholder, Sanders, Baker & Jesko, P.C., Amarillo, Texas. Board Certified in
Business Bankruptcy Law, Texas Board of Legal Specialization and American Bankruptcy
Board of Certification.
1. Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In re Rash), 117 S. Ct. 1879 (1997).
2. See Roger S. Cox, Bankruptcy and Creditors' Rights, 50 SMU L. REv. 989 (1997).
3. This resolved a conflict arising out of what the Court identified as three different
standards for valuing a security interest in a bankruptcy reorganization or debt adjustment
case. See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1883-84 (discussing several circuit-level cases).
4. Id. at 1886.
5. Id.
6. In that footnote, the Court stated:
Our recognition that the replacement-value standard, not the foreclosure-
value standard, governs in cram down cases leaves to bankruptcy courts, as
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It would appear, however, that in the context of motor vehicles, for exam-
ple, retail valuation may be the appropriate starting point.7
2. Interest Rates on Secured Claims
In another major case affecting reorganizations and debt adjustments,
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that in determining post-confir-
mation interest rates for secured claims in Chapter 13 cases, a court
should apply a rebuttable presumption that the contract rate is the appro-
priate rate. In In re Smithwick8 the court noted that in prior cases it rec-
ognized that "[o]ften the contract rate will be an appropriate rate[ ] and
that [n]umerous courts have chosen the contract rate if it seemed to be a
good estimate as to the appropriate discount rate." 9 The court also noted
the Third Circuit's observation of a need to minimize administrative and
litigation costs in Chapter 13 cases, which are "high in volume and low in
absolute value." 10 Additionally, the court recognized the entitlement of
the secured creditor to a return on its investment as if it had foreclosed
and reinvested in loans of equivalent duration and risk, recognizing that
this may indeed preserve a "profit" for the lender."
After addressing these issues in the context of the economic reality
faced by Chapter 13 debtors and creditors, the Fifth Circuit concluded
that using a rebuttable presumption that the contract rate should apply
"balances the competing considerations of maximizing judicial economy
and ensuring an accurate reflection of the costs and risks associated with
the secured lender's 'forced' extension of credit in the chapter 13 plan.' 12
In effect, the court rejected the local rule then in effect in the Southern
District of Texas.13
triers of fact, identification of the best way of ascertaining replacement value
on the basis of the evidence presented. Whether replacement value is the
equivalent of retail value, wholesale value, or some other value will depend
on the type of debtor and the nature of the property. We note, however, that
replacement value, in this context, should not include certain items. For ex-
ample, where the proper measure of the replacement value of a vehicle is its
retail value, an adjustment to that value may be necessary: A creditor should
not receive portions of the retail price, if any, that reflect the value of items
the debtor does not receive when he retains his vehicle .... Nor should the
creditor gain from modifications to the property-e.g., the addition of acces-
sories to a vehicle-to which a creditor's lien would not extend under state
law.
Id. at 1886 n.6.
7. As noted in the preceding footnote, when applying retail valuation, care should be
taken not to include unusual, non-recurring value added items unless there is direct evi-
dence they would be applicable to the collateral under the facts of a particular case.
8. Greentree Fin. Servicing Corp. v. Smithwick (In re Smithwick), 121 F.3d 211 (5th
Cir. 1997).
9. Id. at 213 (quoting In re Briscoe Enters., Ltd., II, 994 F.2d 1160, 1169 (5th Cir.
1993)).
10. Id. at 214 (quoting General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Jones, 999 F.2d 63, 70 (3d
Cir. 1993)).
11. See id. at 214. See also Koopmans v. Farm Credit Servs., 102 F.3d 874, 875 (3d Cir.
1996).
12. Smithwick, 121 F.3d at 215.
13. See id.
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Smithwick provides some predictability to treatment of secured claims
in Chapter 13 cases. More importantly, however, the Fifth Circuit ex-
pressly recognized the economic realities facing courts and parties arising
out of what seems to be an exponential increase in the number of con-
sumer filings. Some may criticize this holding along with the Rash deci-
sion as favoring secured lenders at the expense of unsecured creditors
and debtors; however, given the economic considerations pointed out by
the Fifth Circuit in Smithwick, this may prove to be the only workable
solution.14
3. Interest on Mortgage Arrearages
During the Survey period, the Fifth Circuit addressed yet another situa-
tion involving secured claims in Chapter 13 cases. In In re Cabrera,15 the
court addressed the issue of the appropriate interest rate to apply in the
treatment of an arrearage on a home mortgage claim in a Chapter 13
bankruptcy. Chapter 13 generally provides that a claim secured by a first
lien against a debtor's residence may not be modified by the plan; 16 how-
ever, pre-petition installment arrearages are typically treated in a Chap-
ter 13 plan. The question facing the Cabrera court was what interest rate
to apply. The debtors contended that they should be entitled to apply a
typical Chapter 13 present value discount rate; the secured creditor, how-
ever, sought the contractual rate for past due installments.
The 1994 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code addressed this situa-
tion, specifying that the amount necessary to cure a default would be
based upon the underlying agreement and applicable non-bankruptcy
law. However, that provision applied only to agreements arising on and
after October 22, 1994.17 The Cabrera mortgage was signed in 1989.
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the secured claim for the arrearage
should bear interest at the default rate provided in the contract rather
than the rate proposed by the debtors.18 Accordingly, it appears that in
the Fifth Circuit, pre-petition home mortgage arrearages should bear in-
terest at the contract rate.19
4. Statement of Intent Regarding Consumer Loans
As reported in last year's Survey issue, the Fifth Circuit, in In re John-
son,20 applied a literal interpretation of section 521 of the Bankruptcy
14. Additionally, this author asserts that these are correct decisions under the plain
meaning of the Code and applicable state law.
15. O'Connell v. Troy & Nichols, Inc. (In re Cabrera), 99 F.3d 684 (5th Cir. 1996).
16. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1994).
17. See id. § 1322(e).
18. See Cabrera, 99 F.3d at 686.
19. The Fifth Circuit, however, did not expound upon the correctness of the rationale
of In re Sauls, 161 B.R. 794 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1993), on which the lower court had relied.
The court pointed out that the Cabrera decision was limited to the facts before it; however,
it is difficult to contemplate a substantially different fact pattern arising out of installment
arrearages on a home mortgage.
20. Johnson v. Sun Fin. Co. (In re Johnson), 89 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 1996).
1998]
SMU LAW REVIEW
Code, which requires the filing of a statement of intent regarding con-
sumer debts secured by property of the estate. 21 Essentially, the debtor
must decide whether to redeem the collateral, reaffirm the debt, or sur-
render the property under the Fifth Circuit's interpretation (and indeed
as the statute is written). There is no so-called fourth alternative of sim-
ply retaining the collateral and paying the contracted debt payments.22
Some confusion was created, however, by an opinion issued by Judge
Clark of the Western District in In re Castillo23 in which Judge Clark in-
sisted that the so-called fourth alternative did exist. In the opinion, Judge
Clark followed decisions of the Fourth and Tenth Circuits.24
Toward the end of the Survey period, however, Judge Clark was re-
versed by the District Court, which followed the Fifth Circuit's ruling in
Johnson.25 Accordingly, it remains well settled that in the Fifth Circuit,
the Chapter 7 debtor is limited to the three choices enumerated in section
521. Given what is an apparent split among the circuits, however, it is
possible that this issue may be addressed by the Supreme Court.
B. ExEMPTIONS
1. Retirement Plans
The Fifth Circuit reiterated the exempt status of a qualified individual
retirement account (IRA) in In re Carmichael.2 6 The court reiterated the
exempt status of an IRA despite the absence of anti-alienation provisions
found in other retirement plans.27
In Carmichael, the debtors elected the federal exemption scheme,
which unlike the Texas Property Code,28 does not specify IRAs as among
the exempt pension and profit sharing plans. Rather, when electing fed-
eral exemptions, debtors must rely on the plans enumerated under sec-
tion 522(d)(2)(E) of the Code. That section includes four specifically
enumerated types of plans, and also allows exemptions for a "similar plan
or contract. ''29 The court noted that what was exempt was the debtor's
"right to receive a payment" under such a plan, and thus, it is not the plan
or contract that is exempt, but the right to receive payment from such a
21. See 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(A) (1994). See also Cox, supra note 2, at 1000 (discussing
In re Johnson).
22. This unwritten fourth alternative effectively renders a secured claim a non-re-
course debt after discharge, a result not contemplated by the Code, nor bargained for by
the parties.
23. 209 B.R. 59 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1997).
24. See In re Belanger, 962 F.2d 345 (4th Cir. 1992); In re West, 882 F.2d 1543 (10th
Cir. 1989).
25. See Government Employees Credit Union v. Castillo (In re Castillo) 213 B.R. 316,
317 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1997).
26. Carmichael v. Osherow (In re Carmichael), 100 F.3d 375 (5th Cir. 1996).
27. See id. at 378.
28. Section 42.0021 of the Texas Property Code includes "any individual retirement
account" among the various qualified retirement plans included within the state exemp-
tions. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.0021 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
29. Carmichael, 100 F.3d at 377.
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plan. 30 The court concluded that the facts that IRAs were not enumer-
ated under the federal statute and that a debtor may receive payment
from an IRA prematurely (subject to penalty) were of no significance. 31
Rather, exempting an IRA is consistent with the exemption allowed the
other enumerated types of plans, thereby protecting the policy of provid-
ing honest debtors with a fresh start and protecting such a person's future
income stream.32
2. Self-Settled Trusts
The Fifth Circuit also faced a partially self-settled trust in In re
Shurley.33 In Shurley, the debtor was the beneficiary of a spendthrift
trust settled in part by the debtor, and in part by other members of her
family. The court concluded that to the extent assets were self-settled by
the debtor, those assets were not exempt, and therefore property of the
bankruptcy estate; however, to the extent assets were contributed by per-
sons other than the debtor, the spendthrift nature of the trust protected
the exempt nature of those assets.34
What was somewhat unique in Shurley was that although the court was
faced with a self-settled trust, the trust was only partially self-settled. The
court recognized that there was no compelling Texas authority on the is-
sue of whether the entirety of the beneficiary's interest is subject to credi-
tors' claims when the trust is only partially self-settled. 35 The court
construed Texas law that in upholding the spendthrift nature of spend-
thrift trusts, Texas courts have looked not to consideration for the benefi-
ciary, but rather to the expectations of third party donors to a trust.
36
The court concluded that "[a]llowing creditors to reach only that portion
of the trust contributed by Shurley would further the policy of allowing
her parents to create a spendthrift trust for the benefit of Shurley that is
protected from her creditors, while giving effect to the exception for self-
settled trusts."'37
3. Homesteads-Exceptions
While most consider Texas homesteads to be absolutely sacrosanct,
there are exceptions. For example, in In re Davis,38 the Fifth Circuit al-
lowed a debtor's ex-spouse to levy upon homestead property that was
30. Id.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 378. Additionally, the court emphasized what it perceived as clear con-
gressional intent that IRAs be treated similarly to other retirement plans, noting that "in
the overall retirement scheme of the [Internal Revenue Code], [Congress] selected the
IRA to serve as a sort of universal conductor through which transfers must pass if they are
to avoid the rocks and shoals of inadvertent taxable events." Id.
33. Shurley v. Texas Commerce Bank (In re Shurley), 115 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1997).
34. See id. at 336.
35. See id. at 337.
36. See id.
37. Id. at 338.
38. Davis v. Davis (In re Davis), 105 F.3d 1017 (5th Cir. 1997).
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otherwise exempt under state law in order to satisfy that ex-spouse's
judgment that was considered in the form of maintenance, alimony, or
support. The court found that the Bankruptcy Code in effect superseded
the Texas exemption laws to the extent that the Code expressly limits the
applicability of those laws. In Davis, the court found that section 522
(c)(1) of the Code authorizes certain creditors and lienholders to reach
exempt property.39 Specifically, the court noted that under the Code,
property that is exempt from the estate is immunized against liability for
pre-bankruptcy debts; however, the Code provides a specific exception
for alimony, maintenance, child support, taxes and other specific
liabilities.40
4. Timing of Exemption Claims
Two cases during the Survey provide some guidance with respect to the
timing of exemption claims in bankruptcy. In In re Sandoval,41 the Fifth
Circuit held that in a converted case, the effective date of a homestead
exemption claim should be the date of the original filing, not the date of
conversion. In Sandoval, the debtors filed a Chapter 13, claiming one
house as homestead, and scheduling another house as rental property.
After they were unable to make payments on their original homestead
property, they moved into the rent house, converted the case to a Chap-
ter 7, and sought to claim the rent house which they moved into, as their
homestead. The schedule amendments reflecting the new homestead
claim were filed at or near the time of the conversion from Chapter 13 to
Chapter 7. The Fifth Circuit, however, concluded that the right to ex-
emptions is determined by facts as they exist on the date of the original
bankruptcy petition.42 Therefore, the rent house was not exempt, and
remained property of the estate.43
In In re Malone,44 the bankruptcy court was faced with the Texas Prop-
erty Code exemption of proceeds of a homestead sale for "six months"
after the date of sale.45 In Malone, the debtor filed bankruptcy on May
21, 1996, claiming as exempt remaining proceeds from a pre-petition sale
of a homestead, which occurred on November 21, 1995. The trustee ob-
jected to the debtor's exemption claim, asserting that the sale had oc-
39. See id. at 1022.
40. See id. The court added:
The code does not in such cases, however, preserve or effectuate the state
exemption laws with all of their built in characteristics .... The code uses the
state exemption laws only as a means of identifying and quantifying the prop-
erty that the debtor may exempt under federal law from the bankruptcy
estate.
Id.
41. Sandoval v. Sandoval (In re Sandoval), 103 F.3d 20 (1997).
42. See id. at 23.
43. The court did not address, however, the potential effect of a dismissal and re-filing.
44. 201 B.R. 175 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1996).
45. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001(c) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
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curred more than six months prior because more than 180 days had
elapsed from the date of sale to the petition date.
The bankruptcy court, however, determined that the counting of days,
did not resolve the question, because the statute specified months.46 The
court concluded that based upon the express language of the statute, the
six month period should be just that: six months, regardless of how many
days are in a given month.47 The six month period was found to have
begun running the day after the foreclosure sale.48
5. Homesteads- Urban or Rural/Family Limited Partnerships
In In re Cole49 a judgment creditor objected to what amounted to a
rural homestead claim to six tracts of land that were located within the
city of Denton, Texas. The objecting party, however, did not meet its
burden of proof with respect to whether the property actually constituted
an urban homestead, which would have limited the debtors to one acre.50
Moreover, one of the debtors testified that the tracts were used by his
family as either living quarters or pasture area. Accordingly, the court
found that the tracts were located in a rural area, and therefore poten-
tially subject to the 200 acre rural homestead exemption. 51
Unfortunately for the debtors, however, they had apparently conveyed
most or all of this property to a family limited partnership. The objecting
party presented evidence of deeds to three of the six tracts of land (into
the partnership), and the debtors did nothing to refute that evidence
other than stating that they thought they had transferred the property
back. Based upon partnership law, however, the court found that the
debtors' ownership interests were in the nature of partnership interests,
and therefore considered personal property not subject to a homestead
exemption. 52
Two things can be gleaned from this case. First, just because property
is situated within the city limits of a municipality does not deprive it of
rural character for homestead purposes. Second, despite the fact that the
family limited partnership seems to be a commonly used estate planning
tool, such partnerships are still governed by partnership law, and convey-
ing a homestead to a family limited partnership will most likely deprive it
of its homestead character. 53
46. See Malone, 202 B.R. at 176.
47. See id.
48. See Malone, 201 B.R. at 175-76.
49. 205 B.R. 382 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1997).
50. Texas homestead exemptions are described in Chapter 41 of the Texas Property
Code.
51. See Cole, 205 B.R. at 383.
52. See Cole, 205 B.R. at 385. See TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1, § 7.01
(Vernon Supp. 1998) (stating that, "A partnership interest is personal property. A partner
has no interest in specific limited partnership property.").
53. As the Cole court noted, it is established Texas law that a homestead terminates
upon abandonment, and there is no better evidence of abandonment than conveyance of
the property. See 205 B.R. at 385.
1998]
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6. Motor Vehicles-Tools of the Trade?
In In re Juhasz54 the debtor attempted to avoid a non-possessory, non-
purchase money security interest in a Porsche 944 Turbo, which the
debtor had claimed as exempt as a tool of the trade. No party in interest
had filed a timely objection to the debtor's exemption claim. However,
the court found that the vehicle was not particularly adapted to the
debtor's trade, and therefore, denied lien avoidance.55 This holding is
consistent with at least two other Texas bankruptcy cases. 56
Also of interest in Juhasz was the court's disposition of a motion to lift
stay that had been filed by the creditor whose claim was secured by the
Porsche. The court found that the value of the vehicle was to have been
measured by its approximate replacement cost.57 Accordingly, the credi-
tor was found to have been oversecured. The court further held that in
the absence of evidence regarding ongoing depreciation of the vehicle,
the oversecured creditor would not be entitled to periodic adequate pro-
tection payments, despite the fact that the creditor's equity cushion (if for




The Fifth Circuit heard at least three dischargeability cases involving
the collateral estoppel effect of state court judgments.
The first of two cases involving state court default judgments was In re
Gober.59 In Gober, the court addressed the issue of whether a state court
default judgment entered as a sanction for discovery abuse is entitled to
issue preclusive (collateral estoppel) effect in a subsequent bankruptcy
proceeding. The creditor filed a civil suit in state court alleging the nego-
tiation of unauthorized loans and conversion of loan proceeds and client
funds in an unauthorized account. The debtor filed a general denial and
counterclaims against the creditor. The parties "actively litigated" for
two years; however, the state court ultimately struck the debtor's plead-
ings and entered a default judgment against him.
The Fifth Circuit reiterated that collateral estoppel may apply in cer-
tain circumstances to bar re-litigation of dischargeability issues in bank-
54. 208 B.R. 32 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1997)
55. See id. at 35. The court did not elaborate on how a two-seat, high-performance
luxury sports car could ever be adapted as a tool of the trade.
56. See Hrncirik v. Farmers Nat'l Bank of Seymour, Tex. (In re Hrncirik), 138 B.R. 835
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992); In re Weiss, 92 B.R. 677 (Bankr. N.D. Tex 1988).
57. This was based on a prior version of Rash, issued before the en banc decision was
ultimately reversed by the Supreme Court.
58. See Juhasz, 208 B.R. at 36. The court acknowledged that denial of the motion for
relief from stay was without prejudice upon a later showing of the decline in value of the
vehicle. See id.
59. Gober v. Terra + Corp. (In re Gober), 100 F.3d 1195 (5th Cir. 1996).
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ruptcy court.60 The court also noted that it is to "look to the state that
rendered the judgment to determine whether the courts of that state
would afford the judgment preclusive effect."'61
Essentially, this means the court must determine that the facts asserted
in the second proceeding were "fully and fairly litigated" in the first, that
the facts were essential to the judgment, and that the parties were adver-
saries. The court again distinguished a pre-answer default, in which the
plaintiff's allegations are simply deemed admitted, from a post-answer
default, in which the plaintiff is required to offer evidence. The latter is
typically afforded preclusive effect.62 The Fifth Circuit concluded that a
damages hearing was held and that the court heard sufficient evidence to
determine that the defendant's actions were of "a wanton and a malicious
nature. '63 Because the debtor had the right to participate in that dam-
ages hearing, the court determined that the debtor's mental state was
fully and fairly litigated, and the debtor was precluded from re-litigating
whether his conduct was willful and malicious for purposes of section
523(a) dischargeability.64
In In re Pancake,65 however, the Fifth Circuit held that a record
presented to the bankruptcy court did not establish whether an eviden-
tiary hearing was held. The only indication before the bankruptcy court
was language in the state court judgment in which the court stated that it
heard "the evidence and arguments of counsel. '66 This conclusory state-
ment alone did not satisfy the Fifth Circuit that these same issues were
fully and fairly litigated. In Pancake, the debtor's answer was stricken by
the state court in a situation similar to Gober. However, one can only
conclude that the record in Gober was more complete, explaining the dis-
tinction between the two cases. It should be noted, however, that the
court added that if the creditor can produce record evidence on remand
that the state court actually conducted an evidentiary hearing, "collateral
estoppel may be found to be appropriate. '67
The last of the three cases did not involve a default judgment, but
rather addressed collateral estoppel following a state court jury trial. In
In re Schwager68 the debtor was accused of fraud, defalcation in a fiduci-
ary capacity, and willful and malicious injury.69 In the state court, the
jury awarded compensatory damages against the debtor, finding that he
60. See id. at 1201.
61. See id. at 1205.
62. See id.; Garner v. Lehrer (In re Garner), 56 F.3d 677, 680-81 (5th Cir. 1995) (hold-
ing that issues in a post-answer default judgment are "actually litigated" for collateral es-
toppel purposes and may be given preclusive effect in dischargeability proceedings).
63. Gober, 100 F.3d at 1205.
64. See id.
65. Pancake v. Reliance Ins. Co. (In re Pancake), 106 F.3d 1242 (5th Cir. 1997).
66. Id. at 1244.
67. Id. at 1245.
68. Schwager v. Fallas (In re Schwager), 121 F.3d 177 (5th Cir. 1997).




breached a partnership agreement and his fiduciary duty to limited part-
ners. The court further found that the breach was committed "intention-
ally, maliciously or with heedless and reckless disregard of the rights of
the limited partners. '70 The jury also awarded exemplary damages and
found that the debtor fraudulently induced the limited partners to enter
into the partnership agreement.
The debtor argued, and the Fifth Circuit agreed, that because the jury
found both a breach of the partnership agreement and a breach of fiduci-
ary duty, the conjunctive nature of these findings made it impossible to
determine the basis for the judgment. The theory behind this was found
in a Texas Supreme Court case, which applied the Restatement (Second)
of Judgments in determining when to allow issue preclusion. 71 Essen-
tially, the state court determined that if a judgment of a state court is
based upon determinations of two issues, either of which standing inde-
pendently would support the judgment, the judgment is inconclusive with
respect to either issue standing alone. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit re-
manded the case for a redetermination of the dischargeability issue on
the breach of partnership agreement versus breach of fiduciary duty
findings.
The Fifth Circuit did, however, affirm the lower court's finding that the
debtor was in a fiduciary relationship with the limited partners as a mat-
ter of law. 72 The court further found that by citing section 523(a)(4) as a
basis of non-dischargeability, the debtor was on notice that defalcation in
a fiduciary capacity was adequately plead in the lower court. 73
The net effect of these three cases is that, according to the Fifth Circuit,
collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) is alive and well in dischargeability
litigation; however, the prudent practitioner should be familiar with the
state law applicable to these issues. In addition, in default judgment situ-
ations regarding potentially non-dischargeable claims, a prove-up hearing
is advised. Under the "full faith and credit" clause of the Constitution,
collateral estoppel will only apply if a state court would have provided
the same preclusive effect.
2. Dischargeability-Credit Card Debt
Another issue that has come to the forefront as a result of the increase
in consumer bankruptcies is the dischargeability of credit card debt, espe-
cially that incurred at or near the time of a bankruptcy filing. Many of
these cases turn on the level of reliance necessary to render a credit card
debt non-dischargeable, or whether reliance can be imputed or disposed
of upon an implied representation of ability and intent to pay by the
debtor.
70. Schwager, 121 F.3d at 180.
71. See Eagle Properties, Ltd. v. Scharbauer, 807 S.W.2d 714, 722 (Tex. 1991) (apply-
ing section 27 of the Restatement).
72. See Schwager, 121 F.3d at 181.
73. See id.
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In In re Hernandez74 Judge Leif Clark wrote extensively on this issue.
Faced with a two-party credit transaction between the debtor and Sears,
the court denied a non-dischargeability finding under section 523
(a)(2)(A), because there was apparently no evidence of any actual reli-
ance by Sears.75 The court further disposed of the so called "implied rep-
resentation theory" under which a debtor is held to have implicitly
represented that upon his use of a credit card he has the ability and inten-
tion to pay. This has been an ongoing debate for years; however, Judge
Clark pointed out an interesting issue raised by the "implied representa-
tion" theory. Judge Clark noted that section 523 (a)(2)(A) explicitly ex-
cludes statements regarding a debtor's financial condition. 76 If that is the
case, then section 523 (a)(2)(B) would apply, argued Judge Clark, which
would require any such statement to be in writing.77 Additionally, the
court noted one practicality: "One of the primary reasons people use
credit cards, after all, is a present lack of ability to repay-hence the
name, credit cards." 78
This was not the end of the issues facing the court, however. Sears also
cited section 523(a)(2)(C), the so-called luxury goods exception to dis-
charge, which was enacted by Congress "in an effort to deter the particu-
lar practice of debtors' purchasing numerous unnecessary items on credit
on the eve of bankruptcy with the knowledge that the debt incurred
purchasing the items would be discharged in bankruptcy. '79 In Her-
nandez, the debtors had charged $3,000 of merchandise on their new
Sears credit card, and the next day attended a previously scheduled meet-
ing with a bankruptcy lawyer. The debtors argued that they had returned
some exercise equipment, leaving the debtor only with goods necessary
for their support and maintenance. The court noted, however, that ap-
parently having purchased drapes, curtains, rugs, basketballs, speaker
phones, jewelry, and other items, the debtors had "effectively refurbished
their home at a time when they knew bankruptcy was eminent."80 The
court noted that this was exactly the type of purchase that section
523(a)(2)(C) was enacted to prevent. Accordingly, the court found that
74. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Hernandez (In re Hernandez), 208 B.R. 872 (Bankr.
W.D. Tex. 1997).
75. The court noted:
The evidence presented at the trial in this case proves that the debtor filled
out some kind of credit application; that this information was forwarded to
Sears' Central Credit Application Bureau; and, that a card was issued to the
debtor. From this, we cannot determine whether any of the application infor-
mation was even looked at, let alone relied on, by Sears personnel.
Id. at 877 (emphasis added).
76. See id. at 879.
77. See id. Section 523(a)(2)(B), which deals with false, written financial statements,
also contains its own objective reliance standard, which imposes an even higher reliance
burden on the creditor.
78. Hernandez, 208 B.R. at 879 (emphasis provided by court). The court continued,
"More importantly, the primary reason creditors want customers to use their credit cards is
that very inability of their customers to timely repay their credit card debt." Id.
79. Id. at 880.
80. Id. at 881.
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although the creditor did not establish the necessary element of reliance
under section 523(a)(2)(A), the creditor had established a claim under
section 523(a)(2)(C), rendering the debt non-dischargable. 81
III. DEBT COLLECTION
Finally, yet another issue of continuing importance raised by the con-
sumer credit phenomenon is compliance with the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (the Act). During the Survey period, the Fifth Circuit ad-
dressed at least one situation involving a lawyer acting as a "debt collec-
tor" under the Act. In Taylor v. Perrin, Landry, deLaunay & Durand82 a
creditor sent to its borrower a letter drafted on the letterhead of an
outside law firm, bearing the facsimile signature of one of the firm's law-
yers. The letters were internally generated by the creditor, the law firm
apparently never billed the creditor for these demand letters, and neither
the lawyer nor the law firm was involved in any way in the selection or
account evaluation. The Fifth Circuit found that although the creditor
was collecting its own debt, it was a "debt collector" under the Act be-
cause it used names other than its own in collecting its debt.83 In analyz-
ing this case, the court recognized the "least sophisticated consumer" and
the "unsophisticated consumer" tests used by other courts in determining
whether collection letters contain false, deceptive, or misleading repre-
sentations. 84 The court did not, however, adopt either standard, finding
instead that the acts of the creditor in this case would have been found
deceptive and misleading under either.85
A case out of another circuit may ultimately prove instructive on the
issue of "overshadowing" or in other words, imposing deadlines on con-
sumer debtors that are different than the thirty day opportunity to dis-
pute a debt under the Act. In Bartlett v. Heib186 the initial written
communication from the lawyer/debt collector to the consumer/borrower
required the borrower to take action within a week of the date of the
letter. The borrower took the position that this one week deadline was
inconsistent with a consumer's thirty day opportunity to dispute the debt.
The court found that the initial communication violated the act.87 How-
ever, the court, in an opinion authored by Chief Judge Posner, provided a
sample letter in which a creditor, at least in the Seventh Circuit, could
request that a consumer debtor take certain steps within a period less
than the thirty day period, as long as the debtor is notified of his or her
81. See id. at 882.
82. 103 F.3d 1232 (5th Cir. 1997).
83. See id. at 1236.
84. See id.
85. See id. See also McKenzie v. E.A. Uffman & Assocs., 119 F.3d 358 (5th Cir. 1997)(holding that a collector identifying itself as "Collections Department, Credit Bureau of
Baton Rouge" violated the Act).
86. 128 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 1997).
87. See id. at 501.
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rights under the Act.88 It is uncertain how the Fifth Circuit would deal
with this issue, but this opinion by Judge Posner may ultimately prove
instructive.
88. See id. at 501-02.
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